

SARS-CoV-2 negli animali: zoonosi e zoonosi inversa

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8 Febbraio 2023

Research and professional experience

- Dal Luglio 2022, Professore II fascia Malattie Infettive degli Animali Domestici 07/H3 SSD VET/05, DMVPA, UNINA Malattie infettive ed epidemiologia applicata alle produzioni zootecniche
- 2019-2022, RTDB di Malattie Infettive degli Animali Domestici 07/H3 SSD VET/05, DMVPA, UNINA
- 2015-2019, Borsista di Ricerca, Lab. Microinquinanti Organici Persistenti, IZS Mezzogiorno, Portici (NA)
- 2006-2015, Post-Doc Fellow, DMVPA, UNINA
- 2002-2005, PhD Student, in Biologia, Patologia ed Igiene Ambientale in Medicina Veterinaria, UNINA
- 2001-2002, Titolare di Borsa di Studio, Istituto di Cibernetica del C.N.R. di Arco Felice/Pozzuoli (NA)
- 1996-2000, Manufacturing Manager, nell'Industria Farmaceutica Splendore ALFA INTES, Casoria (NA)

Education

- 1995, Laurea in Chimica e Tecnologia Farmaceutiche, Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza, Roma;
- 1996, Laurea in Farmacia, Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza, Roma;
- 1998, Specializzazione in Farmacologia, DMVPA, UNINA
- 2005, Ph.D. in Biologia, Patologia ed Igiene Ambientale in Medicina Veterinaria (XVII° ciclo), DMVPA, UNINA

Research Interests

- Molecular processes involved in the replication of herpesviruses and coronaviruses, in the presence of environmental contaminants (dioxin) too.
- Correlation between environmental pollutants and viruses in marine animals (bivalves and turtles).
- Surveillance of herpesviruses (BoHV-1, BuHV-1) and coronaviruses (BCoV; SARS-CoV-2) in animals.
- Moreover, she is currently studying the potential antivirals properties of synthetic (MG-132, CH-223191) and natural compounds (secondary fungal metabolites, extracts containing polyphenols and flavonoids) against herpesviruses and coronaviruses infections.



- A zoonosis is any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans
- There are over 200 known types of zoonoses
- Zoonoses comprise a large percentage of new and existing diseases in humans



An estimated 75% of all emerging infectious diseases in filmmans have a zoonotic origin,⁸ meaning they are caused by pathogens from animal hosts. These diseases are a major challenge to futman health, commonly resulting in endemic diseases (leptospirosis, helminthiases, Lyme and hantavirus diseases) and sometimes resulting in epidemics, such as Ebola and HIV/AIDS,^{8,9} and pandemics, such as covid-19 (box 2). The spread of zoonotic diseases also threatens economies; the true economic cost of covid-19 is incalculable, but early estimates indicate that the cumulative financial costs could amount to \$161n (E12ti; €14tin).¹²

the bmj | BMJ 2021;375:n2329 | doi: 10.1136/bmj:n2329

Box 2: Emerging zoonotic diseases and coronaviruses

The United Nations environment programme's *Frontiers* report in 2016 defined emerging zoonotic diseases as those that newly appear in a population or have existed previously but are now rapidly increasing in incidence or geographical range.⁸ Coronaviruses are a family of viruses that cause respiratory and intestinal infections in animals and humans.¹⁰ They include SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV viruses, which were responsible for the outbreaks of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome), respectively,¹⁰ and more recently SARS-CoV-2, which is responsible for the covid-19 pandemic. Although the primary source of SARS-CoV-2 has not been identified, the virus shares up to 90% genetic similarities with other viruses that have been found in horseshoe bats and pangolins.¹¹



Factors responsible for the emergence of novel viruses:





Fig. 1. Feedback loops between tropical deforestation and the COVID-19 pandemic. Zoonotic diseases, public health, economy, agriculture, and forests may all be reciprocally linked in complex positive and negative feedback loops with overarching consequences for nature and society.



Human CoVs: $\alpha - \beta$

SARS-CoV e MERS-CoV: ricombinazione e trasmissione interspecie

pipistrelli = serbatoi naturali di SARS-CoV e MERS-CoV

zibetti di palma, procioni, furetti, cammelli e dromedari = ospiti incidentali

→ hanno facilitato la diffusione di questi virus nell'uomo





(Kenney et al., 2021)

BatCoV - α/β

- Generalmente, no malattie manifeste
- Identità 96.2% SARS-CoV-2 e BatCoV RaTG13!





Mouse and Rat CoVs - β/α

The murine hepatitis virus (MHV) \rightarrow

important research model



(Kenney et al., 2021)

Virus della bronchite infettiva (**IBV**): γ

Patologia respiratoria; renale e riproduttiva

 \rightarrow Notevoli danni economici



ΕCoV: β

 \rightarrow Enteriti nei puledri e negli adulti





(Kenney et al., 2021)

BCoV: β



- ➢ <u>diarrea del vitello</u>→(elevata mortalità)
- ➢ <u>dissenteria invernale</u>→ blocco lattazione;
- infezioni respiratorie nei bovini di varie età

<u>BCoV-like \rightarrow Superamento barriera di specie!</u>

Pecore Capre Bufali - Lama Cervidi Dromedari



Swine CoVs $\alpha - \beta - \delta$

<u>AlfaCoVs</u>

- 1) Virus della gastroenterite trasmissibile (TGEV)
 - (correlato a CCoV e FCoV)
 - ightarrow Diarrea violenta ed elevata mortalità nei suinetti
- 2) Coronavirus respiratorio del suino (PRCoV)
- 3) Virus della diarrea endemica del suino (PEDV)
- 4) Coronavirus della sindrome della diarrea acuta (SADS-CoV)

<u>BetaCoVs</u>

5) Virus dell'encefalomielite emoagglutinante suina (PHEV)

<u>DeltaCoVs</u>

- 6) Deltacoronavirus del suino (PDCoV) (recente)
 - ightarrow danni economici gravi!



(Kenney et al., 2021)

Virus Peritonite Infettiva Felina (FIPV) - α

Da FCoV enterico \rightarrow mutazioni S \rightarrow cambia tropismo:

enterocti \rightarrow monociti/macrofagi \geq virulenza \rightarrow infezione sistemica

 $FIPV \rightarrow gravissima$, letale



Canine CoV - α/β

AlphaCoVs: CCoV \rightarrow causes mild to enteric infectious. Genetic recombination (canine-feline-porcine) \rightarrow pantropic biotypes \rightarrow multi-systemic fatal infections in dogs.

BetaCoVs canine respiratory coronavirus \rightarrow respiratory disease in dogs.

(Kenney et al., 2021)

Recombinant CCoV strains: humans

→ CCoV-HuPn-2018 and HuCCoV_Z19, associated with acute respiratory illness, isolated from humans



Anastasia N. Vlasova^a, Teck-Hock Toh^{b,c}, Jeffrey Soon-Yit Lee^{b,c}, Yong Poovorawan^d, Phillip Davis^e, Marli S. P. Azevedo^f, John A. Lednicky^{9,h}, Linda J. Saif^a and Gregory C. Gray ⁽⁹⁾



| NIH National Lik | Biotechnology Information | sed on 7 February 2023) |
|-------------------|--|---|
| Pub Med.gov | sars-cov-2 Advanced Create alert Create RSS | X Search User Guide |
| | Save Email Send to | Sorted by: Most recent \downarrow Display options \clubsuit |
| MY NCBI FILTERS 🖪 | 191,741 results | |
| my ncbi filters 🖪 | 184,943 results | (Accessed on 27 November 2022) |
| My NCBI FILTERS 🖪 | 179,612 results | (Accessed on 12 October 2022) |



(NIH.GOV)

Variants of concerns – (VOCs)

Increased transmissibility or virulence

- Decreased neutralization by antibodies
- > Capacity to elude detection
- Reduction in therapeutic or vaccine efficiency

Dati di sequenziamento periodo 19 dicembre 2022 – 29 gennaio 2023:

in Italia → 99,97% variante Omicron - 0,03% ricombinante Delta/Omicron BA 5 (87,0%)

www.iss.it

<u>Variante Omicron (Variante B.1.1.529)</u> rilevata per la prima volta in Sud Africa il 24 novembre 2021.
 <u>Variante Delta (Variante VUI-21APR-01, nota anche come B.1.617)</u> rilevata per la prima volta in India.
 <u>Variante Gamma (Variante P.1)</u> con origine in Brasile.
 <u>Variante Beta (Variante 501Y.V2, nota anche come B.1.351)</u> identificata in Sud Africa.

Variante Alfa (Variante VOC 202012/01, nota anche come B.1.1.7) identificata nel Regno Unito.

SARS-CoV-2: spike protein (S)-ACE2



Expression pattern of ACE2 and TMPRSS2



Cell types expressing ACE2 →in purple. Cell types expressing TMPRSS2 →in green.



ACE2 (in human)

SARS-CoV2: Animal susceptibility

The critical step for a virus to infect an animal is its ability to enter the host cells.

SARS-CoV-2 entry into cells first requires the S protein on the surface of the virus to bind the host cell receptor.



SARS-CoV-2: spike-ACE2 (animals)

The susceptibility of animals to SARS-CoV-2 infection

\rightarrow by comparing ACE2 of animals and human.

🐲 viruses

Review

Structural Bases of Zoonotic and Zooanthroponotic Transmission of SARS-CoV-2

Emily Clayton [©], Jacob Ackerley, Marianne Aelmans, Noor Ali, Zoe Ashcroft, Clara Ashton, Robert Barker, Vakare Budryte, Callum Burrows, Shanshan Cai, Alex Callaghan, Jake Carberry [©], Rebecca Chatwin, Isabella Davies, Chloe Farlow, Samuel Gamblin, Aida Iacobut, Adam Lambe, Francesca Lynch, Diana Mihalache, Amani Mokbel, Santosh Potamsetty, Zara Qadir, Jack Soden, Xiaohan Sun, Alexandru Vasile, Otto Wheeler, Mohammed A. Rohaim [©] and Muhammad Munir ^{*}[©]

MDPI



SARS-CoV2: Animal susceptibility

Binding affinity SARS-CoV-2---ACE-2 is not the only factor responsible for the differences in animal susceptibility

- The binding energies between different animal receptors and the SARS-CoV-2 S protein differ;
- ➢ The ACE-2 receptor amino acid sequence varies with species → differing RBD-ACE-2 binding kinetics;
- ➤ The presence of multiple ACE-2 isoforms in animals → may activate/inhibit the binding RBD-ACE-2 → high/low susceptibility;
- > The expression level of ACE2 also affects susceptibility.

(Qiu et al., J Med Virol. 2022; 95, e28147)

SARS-CoV2: (Animal susceptibility)

After the virus binds to the receptor, membrane fusion is also required, a process also mediated by the S protein.

- Two cleavage events are involved, mainly involve two proteases, Furin and TMPRSS2, which are also important triggers for the entry of SARS-CoV-2 into cells;
- > The cellular expression levels of Furin and TMPRSS2 may affect the infectivity of-SARS-CoV-2.
- Cells with high levels of Furin, TMPRSS2, and ACE2 co-expression may also be more susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2.

(Qiu et al., J Med Virol. 2022; 95, e28147)

Coronaviruses: receptors

| Host receptors | Expression sites | Normal function | CoV types | Ref |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| ACE2 | The small intestine, duodenum, heart, kidney, gall bladder testis | Regulate vasoconstriction and blood pressure | A receptor for the SARS-CoV/SARS- CoV-2/HCoV- hCoV-NL63 | (Wan et al., 2020) |
| DPP4/CD26 | Intestines, kidney, placenta | Glucose and insulin metabolism, as well as immune regulation | A receptor for MERS-CoV/bat-CoV HKU4 | (Ng et al., 2022) |
| APN/ANPEP/ CD13) | Intestines | Promote angiogenesis, tumor growth, metastasis | A receptor for the HCoV-229E/PEDV/ TGEV/PEAV/PRCV/Canine CoV/FIPV | (Yu et al., 2003) |
| CEA cell adhesion molecule 1a (CEACAM1a) | Colon, large intestine, small intestine, duodenum | Signaling receptor binding, virion binding, virus receptor activity | A receptor for MHV | (Hemmila et al., 2004) |
| 9-0-Acetylated Sialic Acid | Intestines | Adhesion intercellular, and angiogenic, inhibit the tumor growth | A receptor for the HCoV-OC43/ HCoV-HKU1/TPHEV/BCoV/FIPV | (Hulswit et al., 2019) |
| TMPRSS2 | Prostate, stomach, colon, duodenum | Biological processes such as digestion, inflammatory responses, and so on | Interacts with ACE2 and initiates membrane fusion | (Dong et al., 2020) |
| CD209L | Placenta, lymph node, small intestine, urinary bladder, gall bladder, and duodenum | Encodes a C-type lectin that functions in cell adhesion and pathogen recognition. | Recognize the SARS-CoV | (Amraei et al., 2021) |
| mGluR2 | Brain, testis | Cognitive disorders, drug addiction, psychosis, schizophrenia, anxiety, cerebral ischemia, and epilepsy2 | The ectodomain of mGluR2 interacts with ACE2 and is essential for SARS- CoV-2 internalization | (Singh et al., 2021) |
| AXL | Spleen, endometrium, placenta, lung | Cellular functions, including growth, migration, aggregation, and anti- inflammation | Cooperates with ACE2 to mediate SARS-CoV-2 attachment and entry | (Dagamajalu et al., 2021) |
| KREMEN1 | Skin, esophagus, ovary, heart, testis, colon | A functional receptor for Coxsackievirus A10 | Alternative receptor for SARS-CoV-2 | (Hoffmann and Pöhlmann, 2022) |
| ASGR1 | Liver | Facilitate multiple viral infections, including hepatitis B | Promote SARS-CoV-2 infection | (Gu et al., 2022) |

PLOS PATHOGENS

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Phosphatidylserine receptors enhance SARS-CoV-2 infection

Dana Bohano¹⁶, Hanora Van Erto¹⁶, Natalie Ruggioo¹, Kai J. Rogers¹, Mohammad Badreddine¹, José A. Aguilar Briseñoo¹, Jonah M. Elliff¹, Roberth Anthony Rojas Chavezo¹, Boning Gao², Tomasz Stokowy³, Eleni Christakou^{3,4}, Petri Kursulao^{3,5}, David Micklemo⁴, Gro Gausdal⁴, Hillel Haimo¹, John Minnao², James B. Lorenso³, Wendy Mauryo¹*

| nature |
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| COMMUNICATIONS |
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| ARTICLE (Check for updates |
| https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-25412-x OPEN |
| AHR signaling is induced by infection with |
| coronavirusos |
| CUIUIIAVIIUSES |
| Federico Giovannoni ^{1,8} , Zhaorong Li⊚ ^{1,8} , Federico Remes-Lenicov ² , María E. Dávola ³ , Mercedes Elizalde⊚ ² , Ana Paletta ² , Ali A. Ashkar⊙ ³ , Karen L. Mossman⊙ ³ , Andrea V. Dugour ⁴ , Juan M. Figueroa ⁴ , Andrea A. Barquero ⁵ , Ana Ceballos ² , Cybele C. Garcia ^{® 6,9≅} & Francisco J. Ouintana ^{1,7,9≅} |

🏶 viruses

MDPI

Article

Canine Coronavirus Activates Aryl Hydrocarbon Receptor during In Vitro Infection

Claudia Cerracchio¹, Francesco Serra², Maria Grazia Amoroso² and Filomena Fiorito^{1,*}

Map: cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals reported to WOAH since March

Global situation since the beginning of the pandemic

The worldwide geographical distribution of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in animals reported to WOAH is shown in Figure 1. The first case of SARS-CoV-2 in animals was officially reported to WOAH by Hong-Kong (SARC) on 29 February 2021 in a dog.



https://www.woah.org/ (accessed on 6 February 2023)

SARS-COV-2 IN ANIMALS - SITUATION REPORT 20

Table 1. Number of outbreaks (n=699) reported worldwide, by species and region (as of 31 December 2022).

| Region | | | | |
|------------------------|--------|----------|------|--------|
| | Africa | Americas | Asia | Europe |
| Species | | | | |
| Binturong | | х | | |
| Black-tailed marmoset | | х | | |
| Canada lynx | | Х | | |
| Cat | | х | х | х |
| Common squirrel monkey | | Х | | |
| Dog | | х | х | × |
| Eurasian lynx | | | | × |
| Fishing cat | | х | | |
| Giant anteater | | х | | |
| Gorilla | | х | | х |
| Hamster | | | х | |
| Hippopotamus | | | | х |
| Lion | Х | Х | х | х |
| Mandrill | | х | | |
| Mink | | х | | х |
| Mule deer | | х | | |
| Otter | | Х | | |
| Pet ferret | | х | | х |
| Puma | Х | Х | | |
| Red fox | | | | Х |
| Snow leopard | | Х | | |
| South American coati | | х | | |
| Spotted hyena | | Х | | |
| Tiger | | х | х | Х |
| West Indian manatee | | Х | | |
| White-tailed deer | | х | | |

31/12/2022

26 species

SARS-CoV-2: mammalian hosts



Black arrows = natural infections

Red double arrows = natural infections with demonstrated reverse spillover to humans

Reggiani et al., 2022

DOI 10.3389/fvets.2022.1085613

Green arrows = experimental infections Green circular arrows = demonstrated intra-species circulation

Species with known adapted variants are indicated in blue

Possible sources of SARS-CoV-2 and animal species naturally infected with SARS-CoV-2



Species in the left box can be infected by positive humans. The origins of infection of the species in the right box are not yet clear. The solid black arrows indicate the transmission route of the virus. The red dash line circles indicate that the infected animals can transmit virus between members of the same species.

A red dashed arrow indicates that cross-species transmission has been confirmed, or that there is research showing that cross-species transmission may occur but has not been confirmed.

(Qiu et al., J Med Virol. 2022; 95, e28147)

SARS-CoV2: bats

To date, two bat species, big brown bats (*Eptesicus fuscus*) and Egyptian fruit bats (*Rousettus*

aegyptiacus), have been tested in the laboratory:

- \succ Egyptian fruit bats \rightarrow infected after exposure to inoculated animals
- None of the experimentally infected big brown bats shed virus or transmitted it
- Both species of bat did not develop clinical signs of disease

However, there are over 1,400 bat species worldwide and each species may respond differently to infection...



Low susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection



Articles

Lancet 2022; 399: 1070–78

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 delta variant (AY.127) from pet hamsters to humans, leading to onward human-to-human transmission: a case study

Hui-Ling Yen*, Thomas H C Sit*, Christopher J Brackman, Shirley S Y Chuk, Haogao Gu, Karina W S Tam, Pierra Y T Law, Gabriel M Leung, Malik Peiris, Leo L M Poon, the HKU-SPH study teamt







Probable Animal-to-Human Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Delta Variant AY.127 Causing a Pet Shop-Related Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in Hong Kong

Jasper Fuk-Woo Chan,^{1,2,3} Gilman Kit-Hang Siu,^{3,4} Shuofeng Yuan,¹ Jonathan Daniel Ip,¹ Jian-Piao Cai,¹ Allen Wing-Ho Chu, ¹ Wan-Mui Chan,¹ Syed Muhammad Umer Abdullah,¹ Cuiting Luo,¹ Brian Pui-Chun Chan,¹ Terrence Tsz-Tai Yuen,¹ Lin-Lei Chen,¹ Kenn Ka-Heng Chik,¹ Ronghui Liang,¹ Hehe Cao,¹ Vincent Kwok-Man Poon,¹ Chris Chung-Sing Chan,¹ Kit-Hang Leung,² Anthony Raymond Tam,⁴ Owen Tak-Yin Tsang,⁵ Jacky Man-Chun Chan,⁵ Wing-Kin To,⁶ Bosco Hoi-Shiu Lam,⁶ Lam-Kwong Lee,³ Hazel Wing-Hei Lo,³ Ivan Tak-Fai Wong,³ Jake Siu-Lun Leung,³ Evelyn Yin-Kwan Wong,³ Hin Chu,¹ Cyril Chik-Yan Yip,² Vincent Chi-Chung Cheng,^{1,2} Kwok-Hung Chan,¹ Herman Tse,⁷ David Christopher Lung,^{7,8} Kenneth Ho-Leung Ng,⁹ Albert Ka-Wing Au,⁹ Ivan Fan-Ngai Hung,⁴¹⁰ Kwok-Yung Yuen,^{1,2} and Kelvin Kai-Wang To^{1,2}



The origin of this case was associated with the SARS-CoV-2 δ variant AY.127 in Hong Kong, and an epidemiological investigation of these patients revealed that they were all associated with a local pet store.

SARS-CoV-2-positive samples were found in environmental and hamster samples from pet stores. However, the hamsters were not exhibiting clinical signs.

SARS-CoV2: cattle

Experimental infection \rightarrow <u>low susceptibility</u> to the virus (no transmission).

Viral RNA in only 2/6 inoculated animals, on day 3 after infection.

- High temperature and mild caught
- > RNA Virus detection
- > Antibody to SARS-CoV-2

Experimental Infection of Cattle with SARS-CoV-2

Lorenz Ulrich, Kerstin Wernike, Donata Hoffmann, Thomas C. Mettenleiter, Martin Beer Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2020



Viruses 2021, 13, 441. https://doi.org/10.3390/v13030441

SARS-CoV2: cattle

In April 2021, we investigated, for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 and BCoV, lactating cows on a farm at which 13/20 farmworkers in April 2020 had COVID-19-associated disease, and one of them had died. The farm was located in Ariano Irpino, the first city in the Campania region to be locked down and declared a red zone in March 2020.

👔 animals



Article

First Description of Serological Evidence for SARS-CoV-2 in Lactating Cows

Filomena Fiorito ¹⁽⁰⁾, Valentina Iovane ², Ugo Pagnini ¹, Claudia Cerracchio ¹, Sergio Brandi ³, Martina Levante ³, Luisa Marati ³, Gianmarco Ferrara ¹⁽⁰⁾, Virginio Tammaro ⁴, Esterina De Carlo ³,*, Giuseppe Iovane ¹,* and Giovanna Fusco ³⁽⁰⁾



The farm included heifers, beef cows, lactating cows.

To test also milk samples, we sampled only lactating cows.

The herd had never been vaccinated against BCoV.

Nasal and rectal swabs, serum and milk samples were analysed.

Results/1

| | | Table 1. Results from serum analyses of sampled cows. | | | | | |
|---|--------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--|
| All nasal and rectal swabs, as well as all milk samples \rightarrow negative for SARS-CoV-2 RNA | Sample ID | Age (in years) | Ab Anti-N SARS-CoV-2 (r-n COI*) | Ab Anti-S SARS-CoV-2 (U/mL) | MTN** for SARS-CoV-2 | MTN for BCoV | |
| | 1 | 3 | - | - | - | - | |
| The results on corum complex: | 2 | 8 | 1.45 | 1.74 | 1:80 | - | |
| me results on serum samples. | 3 | 6 | 3.57 | 1.41 | 1:40 | - | |
| | 4 | 5 | | | - | - | |
| • $8/24 \rightarrow$ negative for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies detection; | 5 | 10 | 5.02 | 249.00 | 1:160 | - | |
| | 6 | 2 | | | - | - | |
| • $11/24 \rightarrow$ antihodies for SARS-CoV-2 N | 7 | 2 | | - | - | - | |
| | 8 | 11 | - | 26.25 | 1:40 | - | |
| | 9 | 3 | 5.60 | 219.20 | 1:160 | - | |
| | 10 | 2 | | - 2 47 | - | - | |
| • $14/24 \rightarrow$ antibodies for SARS-CoV-2 S | 11 | 2 | - 171 | 5.47 | 1.20 | | |
| | 12 | 2 | 4.71 | | 1.20 | | |
| | 14 | 2 | 2 27 | 1 60 | | | |
| | 15 | , 11 | - | 68 59 | 1:40 | _ | |
| • $13/24 \rightarrow$ developed SARS-COV-2-neutralising antibodies | 16 | 3 | | - | - | - | |
| | 17 | 7 | 1.38 | | 1:80 | | |
| | 18 | 10 | - | | - | | |
| | 19 | 10 | 2.21 | 58.66 | 1:40 | | |
| All the samples \rightarrow BCoV-negative (MTN \geq 4): | 20 | 13 | 1.56 | 39.28 | 1:20 | - | |
| | 21 | 18 | 2.45 | 176.40 | 1:20 | | |
| | 22 | 9 | 7.40 | 247.50 | 1:80 | | |
| | 23 | 11 | | 80.06 | 1:80 | | |
| | 24 | 13 | | 12.04 | - | | |

*COI= Cut-off index; **MNT= microneutralization test.

Pos Ab ≥ 0.8 COI

Pos MNT ≥ 20

Pos MNT ≥ 4

Pos Ab ≥ 1 COI

None of the cows with neutralizing antibodies displayed fever, diarrhea and/or respiratory signs at the time of sampling

Table 2. SARS-CoV-2 positivity (MTN) among cows divided into groups by possible risk factor (age and pregnancy status).



The presence of SARS-CoV-2-neutralising antibodies and the age of the cows showed a significant relationship (P < 0.05).

- Comparison of the 1–5-year-old group to the >10-year-old group yielded a statistically significant two-sided p value (P = 0.041).
- No correlation with pregnancy status was detected.

Conclusions

- The first report of natural SARS-CoV-2 seroconversion in cattle
- It may represent a case of <u>reverse zoonosis</u>
- However, the role of cattle in SARS-CoV-2 infection seems to be negligible







SARS-CoV2: sheep and goats



| | Total | ELISA |
|----------|-------|-------|
| | | N |
| Province | | |
| Salerno | 508 | 19 |
| Caserta | 104 | 4 |
| Species | | |
| Sheep | 488 | 17 |
| Goats | 124 | 6 |
| Sex | | |
| Female | 577 | 21 |
| Male | 35 | 2 |
| Age | | |
| 0–5 y | 401 | 18 |
| 5–10 y | 167 | 4 |
| >10 y | 44 | 1 |
| Total | 612 | 23 |

Veterinary Research Communications https://doi.org/10.1007/s11259-022-10044-3

BRIEF REPORT



First serological evidence of SARS-CoV-2 natural infection in small ruminants

Brief report

Giovanna Fusco¹ · Lorena Cardillo¹ · Martina Levante¹ · Sergio Brandi¹ · Gerardo Picazio² · Michele Napoletano³ · Alessandra Martucciello⁴ · Filomena Fiorito⁵ · Esterina De Carlo⁶ · Claudio de Martinis¹

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Abstract

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in late December 2019 and spread worldwide, quickly becoming a pandemic. This zoonotic coronavirus shows a broad host range, including wildlife and domestic animals. Small ruminants are shown to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 but, to date, no natural infection has been reported. Herein, we performed a survey for SARS-CoV-2 among sheep and goats in the Campania region of Italy using an indirect multispecies ELISA. Next, positive sera were submitted to virus serum neutralization for the quantification of specific neutralizing antibodies. Out of 612 sheep and goats, 23 were found ELISA positive (3.75%) and 1 of them showed 1:20 neutralizing antibodies titer. No significant difference was found between the two species, as well as between male and female, geographical location and age. Our findings demonstrate that natural infection can occur in flocks in a field situation. Moreover, low susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 is reported for sheep and goats, nevertheless, the continuous mutations of this virus open new scenarios on viral host range and tropism, highlighting the importance of investigating animal species that could represent ongoing or future possible hosts.

SARS-CoV2: dog

- Experimental studies (virus replication, but not shedding)
- Natural infections (*Canis lupus*) \rightarrow <u>low susceptibility</u> to viral infections:
 - > Mild respiratory signs, gastrointestinal signs, ocular signs, anorexia,
 - lethargy, or asymptomatic
 - RNA Virus detection
 - Antibody to SARS-CoV-2





SARS-CoV2: Felidae

- Experimental studies (virus replication and shedding; young >> more susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infections than adults)
- Natural infections (*Felis catus*) and in lions, tigers, snow leopards, cougars → <u>high</u> susceptibility to viral infections:
 - Mild respiratory signs, dyspnea, gastrointestinal signs, sneezing, clear ocular discharge, mild lethargy, anorexia, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, thrombocytopenia, general symptoms or asymptomatic
 - > RNA Virus detection
 - > Antibody to SARS-CoV-2



SARS-CoV-2: cat





VIROLOGY



SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Human to Pet and Suspected Transmission from Pet to Human, Thailand

© Chutchai Piewbang,^{a,b} ® Panida Poonsin,^{a,b} ® Pattiya Lohavicharn,^{a,b} ® Sabrina Wahyu Wardhani,^{a,b,c} ® Wichan Dankaona,^{a,b} ® Jiratchaya Puenpa,^d ® Yong Poovorawan,^d ® Somporn Techangamsuwan^{a,b}

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ABSTRACT Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), has been the cause of human pandemic infection since late 2019. SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals has also been reported both naturally and experimentally, rendering awareness about a potential source of infection for one health concern. Here, we describe an epidemiological investigation of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 639 cats and 224 dogs throughout multiple waves of COVID-19 outbreaks in Thailand. To indicate the potential source of infection, we performed SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing of samples obtained from pets and contacted humans, combined with in-depth interviews to support the epidemiological investigation. In the tested animals, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was present in 23 cases (19 cats and 4 dogs). Whole-genome sequencing of selected samples showed various SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, which included the original European lineage (B.1), Alpha (B.1.1.7), Delta (B.1.617), and Omicron (BA.2). Among SARS-CoV-2-positive pets, 34.78% had evidence of contact with infected humans. Together with genomic analysis and an overlapping timeline, we revealed evidence of viral transmission from infected humans as the primary source, which spread to household cats via an undefined mode of transmission and most likely circulated between cohoused cats and caretakers within the weeks before the investigation. The SARS-CoV-2 surface glycoprotein (spike gene) obtained from caretakers of individual cats contained sequence signatures found in the sequences of infected cats, indicating possible exposure to the virus excreted by cats. Although pet-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is considered relatively rare, our study provides suspected episodes of human infection from animals that were initially infected through contact with infected humans.

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SARS-CoV2: mink

Minks have a high susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 natural infection.

The virus appears to spread among minks and generate several new mutations,

resulting in increased viral virulence.

- Mild to severe respiratory signs (interstitial pneumonia), anorexia, death
- RNA Virus detection
- Antibody to SARS-CoV-2



Hoffmann et al., 2021

SARS-CoV2: white-tailed deer

PNAS 2022 Vol. 119 No. 6 e2121644119

Multiple spillovers from humans and onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in white-tailed deer

Suresh V. Kuchipudi^{a,b,1}, Meera Surendran-Nair^{a,b}, Rachel M. Ruden^{c,d}, Michele Yon^a, Ruth H. Nissly^{a,b}, Kurt J. Vandegrift^e, Rahul K. Nelli^d, Lingling Li^a, Bhushan M. Jayarao^a, Costas D. Maranas^f, Nicole Levine^{b,g}, Katriina Willgert^h, Andrew J. K. Conlan^h, Randall J. Olsen^{i,j,k}, James J. Davis^l, James M. Musser^{i,j,k}, Peter J. Hudson^e, and Vivek Kapur^{b,g,1}

| 540 | • |
|-----|---------|
| | viruses |
| | |

MDPI

Article

SARS-CoV-2 Omicron (B.1.1.529) Infection of Wild White-Tailed Deer in New York City

Kurt J. Vandegrift ^{1,2,*}, Michele Yon ³, Meera Surendran Nair ^{3,4}, Abhinay Gontu ^{3,4}, Sasanthamani Ramasamy ^{3,4}, Saranya Amirthalingam ^{3,4}, Sabarinath Neerukonda ⁵, Ruth H. Nissly ^{3,4}, Shubhada K. Chothe ^{3,4}, Padmaja Jakka ^{3,4}, Lindsey LaBella ^{3,4}, Nicole Levine ⁶, Sophie Rodriguez ⁶, Chen Chen ⁷, Veda Sheersh Boorla ⁷, Tod Stuber ⁸, Jason R. Boulanger ⁹, Nathan Kotschwar ⁹, Sarah Grimké Aucoin ¹⁰, Richard Simon ¹⁰, Katrina L. Toal ¹⁰, Randall J. Olsen ^{11,12}, James J. Davis ^{13,14}, Dashzeveg Bold ¹⁵, Natasha N. Gaudreault ¹⁵, Krishani Dinali Perera ¹⁵, Yunjeong Kim ¹⁵, Kyeong-Ok Chang ¹⁵, Costas D. Maranas ⁷, Juergen A. Richt ¹⁵, James M. Musser ^{11,12}, Peter J. Hudson ^{1,2}, Vivek Kapur ^{2,6,*} and Suresh V. Kuchipudi ^{2,3,4,*}



Significance

The results provide strong evidence of extensive SARS-CoV-2 infection of white-tailed deer, a free-living wild animal species with widespread distribution across North, Central, and South America. The analysis shows infection of deer resulted from multiple spillovers from humans, followed by efficient deer-to-deer transmission. The discovery of widespread infection of white-tailed deer indicates their establishment as potential reservoir hosts for SARS-CoV-2, a finding with important implications for the ecology, long-term persistence, and evolution of the virus, including the potential for spillback to humans.



RESEARCH ARTICLE ECOLOGY

OPEN ACCESS



White-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) may serve as a wildlife reservoir for nearly extinct SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern

Leonardo C. Caserta^{a,b,1} (10), Mathias Martins^{a,1} (10), Salman L. Butt^{a,1} (10), Nicholas A. Hollingshead^c, Lina M. Covaleda^{a,b}, Sohel Ahmed^c (10), Mia R. R. Everts^b, Krysten L. Schuler^{b,c} (10), and Diego G. Diel^{a,b,2} (20)

SARS-CoV-2 VOCs in animals



Saied and Metwally, 2022

Guidance to report cases of animals infected with SARS-CoV-2 to WOAH



Guidance

Reporting SARS-CoV-2 to the OIE

a-reporting-sars-cov-2-to-the-oie.pdf (woah.org)



REPORTING SARS-COV-2 TO THE OIE

Reporting obligations of OIE Members are intended to support:

- Early warning surveillance for animal health events.
- Understanding of dynamic epidemiology for animal health events.
- Understanding of control measures taken in response to events, and their impact.
- Analysis of risks that other Members may be exposed to.

SARS-CoV-2 is an *emerging disease* which means, as defined by the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, "a new occurrence in an <u>animal</u> of a disease, <u>infection</u> or <u>infestation</u>, causing a significant impact on animal or public health resulting from:

a change of a known pathogenic agent or its spread to a new geographic area or species; or
 a previously unrecognised pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time."

OIE Members are required to notify the OIE of the detection of an emerging disease as set out in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*:

CHAPTER 1.1.

Article 1.1.4.

Veterinary Authorities shall, under the responsibility of the Delegate, send to the Headquarters:

- a <u>notification</u> through WAHIS or by fax or email, when an <u>emerging disease</u> has been detected in a country, a <u>zone</u> or a <u>compartment</u>;
- 2. periodic reports subsequent to a *notification* of an *emerging disease*:
 - a. for the time necessary to have reasonable certainty that:
 - i. the disease, *infection* or *infestation* has been eradicated; or
 - ii. the situation has become stable;

OR

- b. until sufficient scientific information is available to determine whether it meets the criteria for inclusion in the OIE list as described in Chapter <u>1.2.;</u>
- 3. a final report once point 2 *a*) or *b*) above is complied with.

One Health Approach:

Mandatory or not mandatory?

| | Codes and Manuals Public | ations Documentary Porta | I Training Platform | Bookshop | EN FR ES |
|--------------------|--|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------|
| World Organisation |] | Animal Diseases | Avian Influenza | Observatory | Q SEARCH |
| Founded as OIE | WHO WE ARE $ \!$ | WHAT WE DO V | VHAT WE OFFER ~ | MEDIA ~ | WAHIS 7 |

Home » What we offer » Emergency Preparedness » COVID-19



COVID-19

In a few months the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted our communities and ways of life. With devastating effects on society in nearly all countries of the globe, it has also heavily challenged our food supply chains, livelihoods, economies as well as animal production systems. All these components are intrinsically linked. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a new evidence that a longstanding and sustainable <u>One Health collaboration is</u> needed. PNAS • PERSPECTIVE

OPEN ACCESS

Pandemic origins and a One Health approach to preparedness and prevention: Solutions based on SARS-CoV-2 and other RNA viruses

Gerald T. Keusch^{a,1}, John H. Amuasi^{b,c,d}, Danielle E. Anderson^e(), Peter Daszak^f(), Isabella Eckerle^{g,h}, Hume Field^{f,i}(), Marion Koopmans^j, Sai Kit Lam^k(), Carlos G. Das Neves^{l,m}(), Malik Peirisⁿ(), Stanley Perlman^o(), Supaporn Wacharapluesadee^p(), Su Yadana^f(), and Linda Saif^{0,1}()

Edited by Xiang Jin Meng, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA; received June 14, 2022; accepted August 18, 2022

Our Response Questions and answers Events in animals

Expert groups and guidance Resources

Members have been keeping WOAH updated on any investigations or outcomes of investigations in animals:

Page last updated 9 January 2023

One health strategy!

SARS-CoV-2 in animals

Infected humans may produce very high viral load \rightarrow increasing the chances of spillover to other animal species such as pet animals, farm animals, and wild animals inhabiting areas close to human community



Animal species must be tested \rightarrow to prevent any spillovers!!!

8TH CALL OF THE FAO-OIE ADVISORY GROUP ON SARS COV-2 EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS

2nd March 2022

Participants: Ann Cullinane (Chair, IEC, Ireland), Bart Haagmans (Erasmus MC, The Netherlands), Evelyne Picard-Meyer (ANSES), John Dennehy (Queens College), John Korslund (USDA APHIS), Leo Poon and Malik Peiris (HKU), Linfa Wang (Duke-NUS, Singapore), Marc Johnson (University of Missouri), Marine Wasniewski (ANSES), Nicola Lewis (RVC, UK), Richard Orton (Glasgow University, UK), Virginie Lattard (VetAgroSup), Vivek Kapur (Penn State University, USA), Stephane de la Rocque (WHO), OIE Preparedness & Resilience and Science Departments

Agenda

- Findings in white-tailed deer (Vivek Kapur, Penn State University)
- 2. 3. 4.
- 2. Update on hamsters (Malik Peiris or Leo Poon, HKU, and Richard Orton, Glasgow University)
 - SARS-CoV-2 sequences in wastewater (Marc Johnson, University of Missouri, and John Dennehy, Queens College and The Graduate Center of CUNY)
 - Surveillance in urban rodents and wastewater (Marine Wasniewski (ANSES), Evelyne Picard-Meyer (ANSES), Virginie Lattard (VetAgroSup))
 - 5. Early observations in mink post-vaccination monitoring (John Korslund, USDA APHIS)



SARS-CoV-2 origin



Viruses reach humans when they invade such ecosystems, including forests, and come into contact with the virus-bearing wildlife living there...

| Check for updates Madrid Cite this as: <i>BMJ</i> 2021;375:n2588 | Covid-19: New WHO group to look into pander | NEWS | THE COVID LAB-LE HYPOTHESIS: WHA DO AND DON'T KNO Nature examines arguments that the escaped from a lab in China, and the |
|--|---|-----------|--|
| http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n2588 Published: 22 October 2021 www.thelancet.com | Paul D Thacker | Editorial | By Amy Maxmen & Smriti Mallapaty of wh ebate over the idea that the corona- virus SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a laboratory has escalated over the past for weeks, coinciding with the annual World Health Assembly, at which the World Health Organization (WHO) and offi- ha cials from nearly 200 countries discussed the SCOUD Diegenia Mergina Marchaet and the second |
| Searching for | SARS-CoV-2 origins: the saga continues | | Opinion Let's le |

The Wuhan Institute of Virology carries out research on coronaviruses because these pathogens are endemic to the region where it's located AK **T SCIENTISTS** he coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 e science behind them. irology (WIV), located in the Chinese city Nature looks at the key arguments that re the first COVID-19 cases were reported. support a lab leak, and the extent to which 26 May, US President loe Biden tasked the research has answers. Intelligence Community to join efforts ind SARS-CoV-2's origins, whatever they There's not yet any substantial evidence for a lab leak. Why are ht be, and report back in 90 days. ustralia, the European Union and Japan scientists still considering it? e also called for a robust investigation into Scientists don't have enough evidence about S-CoV-2's origins. The WHO has yet to reveal the origins of SARS-CoV-2 to rule out the labnext phase of its investigation. But China leak hypothesis, or to prove the alternative sked that the probe examine other coun- - that the virus has a natural origin. Many eave the covid origin mystery to scientists

OF VIROLOGY, CAS

...The not-quite-solved mystery of exactly where this virus came from and how it found its way into humans, on the other hand, is a scientific question best left to scientists... By David Quammen, January 23, 2023 The Washington Post

SARS-CoV-2 origin



Check for updates

PNAS . OPINION

A call for an independent inquiry into the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus

Neil I. Harrison^{a,b,1} and leffrey D. Sachs⁴



Since the identification of theSARS-CoV-2 in Wuhan, China, in January 2020 since the demunication or mesaws-sorv_i in woman, tensing, in january 2020 (1), the origin of the wirus has been a topic of interes scientific debate and public speculation. The two main hypotheses are that the virus emerged from human exposure to an infrected animal fixed provides (2) rooms (2) or that it emerged in a research-related incident (3). The investigation into the origin of the virus has been made difficult by the lack of key evidence from the earthat has wet to be n liest days of the outbreak-there's no doubt that greater transparency on lies days of the outpreak—dirers no object that greater transparency on the part of Chines authorities would be commusity height. Nevertheless, we argue here that there is much important information that can be gleaned from US-based research institutions, information not yet made available for independent, transparent, and scientific scrutiny. The authors declare no competing interest The data available within the United States would explicitly include, but The data available within the United Starts would exploiting include, but are not limited to visil sequencing subjected and held as part of the PREDCT project and other funded programs, as well as sequencing data and labo-agnorise, most northally the NH, to subject a full, independent, and transpar-ent investigation of the origins of SARS-GV-2. This should take place, for example, within a tightly focused science-based bapartian Congressional inquiry with full investigative powers, which would be able to ask important questions—but and imguided within their sponters former by politics. Than the positions of the origin of the origin of the politics of the politics former sections—but and imguided within the government mere by politics. Then the politics of the origin of the origin of the politics of the politics former sections—but are the politics. Then the politics that the politics former sections—but are the politics. Then the politics that the politics that the politics that the politics than the politics that the politics t Copyright © 2022 the Authoriti, Published by PNAC This article is distributed under Creative Common This article contains supporting information online a by science. Published May 19, 2022.

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https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2202769119 1 of 5



SARS-CoV-2 furin cleavage site was not engineered

Robert F. Garry^{a,b,c,1}

Harrison and Sachs (1) make a serious accusation against • The insertion adds a proline not present in ENaC. scientists at the University of North Carolina (UNC) and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) based on an eightamino-acid sequence similarity between the furin cleavage site (FCS) of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Spike and one of the FCSs of human amiloride-sensitive epithelial sodium channel a subunit (ENaC) (2). Both proteins have the sequence RRARSVAS (Fig. 1A) Harrison and Sachs cite work on rat ENaC from UNC (3, 4) and suggest that the UNC and WIV coronavirologists may have mimicked human ENaC FCS to make SARS-CoV-2 more infectious for lung epithelia. Numerous features of SARS-CoV-2 FCS demonstrate

- that it was not engineered to mimic human ENaC: Alignment of the nucleotide sequence of the SARS-CoV-2
- Spike gene with the closest known coronavirus Spike gene from Laotian bat coronavirus BANAL-20-52 (5) clearly shows that four extra amino acids (PRRA), not eight, were added to the SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein (Fig. 18) There was an insertion of 12 nucleotides into the Spike gene (Fig. 1B, box) (6). This nucleotide insertion is out of

each of the codons for RRARSVAS is different in human ENaC and SARS-CoV-2 (Fig. 1B). • Five of eight amino acids (RSVAS; underlined in Fig. 1A, red box in Fig. 1C) in or near the ENaC FCS sequence shared with SARS-Cov-2 Spike are present in Spikes of sarbecoviruses, such as BANAL-20-52. It would be illogical to use the FCS from ENac rather than from a FCS of another coronavirus.

• Except for one codon (cgu that encodes arginine 685),

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Author contributions: R.F.G. designed research, performed research, analyzed data and wrote the pape Competing interest statement: R.F.G. is the cofounder of Zalgen Labs, a biotecompany developing countermeasures to emerging viruses. Copyright © 2022 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND). ¹Email: rfgarry@tulane.edu

Published September 29, 2022.



Reply to Garry: The origin of SARS-CoV-2 remains unresolved

September 29, 2022

Neil L. Harrison^{a,1} and Jeffrey D. Sachs^{b,1}

There is no consensus on the origin of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (1). We recently called for an independent inquiry (2). Garry has commented (3), as quoted, and we respond briefly here.

LETTER

"FCSs are common in coronaviruses, and present in representatives of four out of five betacoronavirus subgenuses."

We stated that the furin cleavage site (FCS) in SARS-CoV-2 is unique among sarbecoviruses (ref. 2 and Fig. 1), although FCSs are common in other betacoronaviruses (2).

"The highly variable nature of the S1/S2 junction is easily ascertained by inspecting a precise alignment of sarbecovirus Spikes."

Garry's limited alignment of seven Spike protein sequences (3) is far from precise. RacCS203, for example, lacks the arginine, serine residues (RS) present in the other

frame (6, 7).

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Author contributions: N.L.H. and J.D.S. wrote the paper. Competing interest statement: J.D.S. is Chair of the Lancet Commission on COVID-19. The authors declare no competing financial or scientific interests.

Copyright © 2022 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND). ¹To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: nh2298@columbia.edu or sachs@ei.columbia.edu. Published November 2, 2022.

November 2, 2022



November 11, 2022

SARS-CoV-2 origin

AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY

Advisory Board, mBio

mBio

SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic?



Laboratory-Related Origin

Direct Zoonosis

| TABLE 1 Precedents for the four infection pathways by which SARS-COV-2 could have entered the human population | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|--|-----------|--|
| Pathway | Description | Precedent | Reference | |
| Direct zoo | onosis | | | |
| Α | Intermediate host | SARS outbreak follows transmission of SARS-CoV from bats to civets to humans | 18 | |
| | | Canine origin coronavirus outbreak in Malaysia | 30 | |
| B | Direct infection from bat | SARS-related coronavirus (SARSr-CoV) strain RaTG13 in miners | 9 | |

Laboratory-related origin

| caboratory | related origin | | |
|------------|--|--|----|
| C | Direct infection from bat (same as pathway | As in pathway B, SARS-related coronavirus (SARSr-CoV) strain RaTG13 in | 9 |
| | B except that infection occurs in course | miners, except that in this situation the cave visitors would be investigating | |
| | of scientific research) | bat-associated viruses | |
| D | Laboratory accident | SARS infection in lab workers | 14 |
| | | | |

SARS-CoV-2: the early epicenter in Wuhan

RESEARCH

CORONAVIRUS

The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was the early epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic

Michael Worobey^{1*}, Joshua I. Levy², Lorena Malpica Serrano¹, Alexander Crits-Christoph³, Jonathan E. Pekar^{4,5}, Stephen A. Goldstein⁶, Angela L. Rasmussen^{7,8}, Moritz U. G. Kraemer⁹, Chris Newman¹⁰, Marion P. G. Koopmans^{11,12}, Marc A. Suchard^{13,14,15}, Joel O. Wertheim¹⁶, Philippe Lemey^{17,18}, David L. Robertson¹⁹, Robert F. Garry^{18,20,21}, Edward C. Holmes²², Andrew Rambaut²³, Kristian G. Andersen^{2,24*}

Worobey et al., Science 377, 951–959 (2022) 26 August 2022

Live SARS-CoV-2–susceptible mammals (red foxes, hog badgers, and common raccoon dogs), were sold live at the Huanan market up until in late 2019 and that within the market, SARS-CoV-2–positive environmental samples were spatially associated with vendors selling live mammals.

References



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22 Febbraio 2023 - Prof. Natascia Cocchia - Tumore mammario o infezione all'utero? È colpa mia... se solo le avessi fatto fare una cucciolata



Grazie per l'attenzione!